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1 Introduction
International comparisons show that the US is the world’s most productive economy1
and much research has gone into understanding the determinants of this productivity
leadership. There are two broad categories of factors that could be responsible for this
success: on the one hand the business environment and on the other firm or plant specific
factors. The business environment comprises the quality of a country’s workforce, the
efficiency of public infrastructure as well as geographical advantages. Firm and plant
specific factors include more efficient production processes and management techniques,
better marketing or more valuable patents or brands. Plant level studies of business units
located in the same country but owned by firms of different nationalities can potentially
distinguish between these two hypotheses. Since the business environment is the same for
all plants in the sample, any observed productivity differences are due to differences in
plant or firm specific factors.
When examining foreign ownership effects such as the suggested US advantage in
plant level datasets we have to be careful in choosing our comparison group. For various
countries – including the US – researchers2 have found that foreign owned firms are on
average more productive than domestic ones. However, since foreign owned plants are
by definition part of a multinational enterprise (MNE) whereas only a small fraction
of domestic firms are multinational, this might reflect a general MNE advantage rather
than country specific advantages. Several theoretical studies (see for example Dunning
(1981); Helpman (1984); Markusen (1995)), suggest that factors such as language barriers
and ignorance of local business networks give foreign firms a disadvantage. Thus, since
setting up abroad is likely to be more expensive than setting up at home, if MNE firms
nevertheless manage to stay in business, they must have superior firm specific assets –
such as better management techniques and better production technology – that they can
share with their affiliates.3
Therefore, in order to compare like with like we need to compare US MNEs with
1see for example O’Mahony and de Boer (2002).
2 For the UK: Griffith (1999), Griffith and Simpson (2001), Oulton (2000) and Harris (1999) using
the ARD; Conyon et al. (2002) using firm level data; Davies and Lyons (1991) using industry level data.
The study by Doms and Jensen (1998) for the US. Lipsey and Sjoholm (2002) document higher wages
paid by foreign-owned firms in Indonesia.
3We concentrate here on testing the “Ownership” hypothesis of the Dunning’s Ownership Location
Internalisation framework.
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other – domestic and foreign – MNEs. While foreign ownership identifiers are commonly
included in plant level productivity datasets, data that would allow the identification
of domestic MNEs has been scarce. Doms and Jensen (1998) is the first US study that
controls for the multinationality of domestic firms. They find that, among multinationals,
plants owned by US MNEs are the productivity leaders in the US, whereas domestic non
MNE plants lag far behind MNEs owned units.
Using a newly available dataset – the Annual Inquiry into Foreign Direct Investment
(AFDI) – we are, for the first time, able to identify domestic MNEs in a large scale UK
plant level productivity dataset. This allows us to make several contributions to the
existing literature. Firstly, our study qualifies the findings of Doms and Jensen in one
important respect: in their study they cannot rule out that the leadership of US MNE
owned plants is the consequence of a home advantage rather than of intrinsic transferable
firm level advantages. The first innovation of this paper, therefore, is to establish the
leadership of US MNEs in Britain, which shows that the US MNE advantage found by
Doms and Jensen is not a home advantage. Secondly, we confirm with British data that
the foreign ownership advantage is indeed by and large an MNE advantage. Finally, we
attempt to explain the nature of the US and MNE advantage further using the longitudi-
nal dimension of our data. We examine two questions. First, are the drivers of the MNE
and the US advantage firm or plant specific? This distinction is important because the
Dunning account, and many theories involving MNEs (see for example Markusen (1995)
and Helpman (1984)), assume a firm specific advantage that multinational enterprises can
share among plants. An alternative explanation is that the MNE productivity advantage
is driven by an ability of MNEs to takeover plants which themselves have superior pro-
ductivity even before the takeover. We find that the MNE advantage consists of both
firm and plant effects. On the other hand, the additional US advantage seems to be
primarily driven by plant effects. US MNEs take over plants that are about 10 percent
more productive than plants taken over by other MNEs.
We also examine if there is evidence for a causal relationship from foreign engagement
of a firm to the productivity of its plants in the home market.4 This would be in line with
technology sourcing or other learning effects (see for example Branstetter (2001) and for
a review Keller (2004)). To identify such effects we look at UK firms that start investing
4Dunning’s theory would suggest a causal relation from superior productivity to foreign direct invest-
ment.
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abroad – i.e. become multinational – during our sample period. However, we do not find
any significant evidence for such an effect.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in sections 2 and 3 we describe our
dataset. Section 4 shows that US owned plants are the productivity leaders in the UK,
both in terms of labour productivity and in terms of total factor productivity (TFP), and
that only part of the US ownership advantage can be explained by a multinational effect.
In section 5 we show that this result is robust to alternative classifications of the foreign
group and to different specifications of the production function. In particular, we show
the robustness of our results when we control for the endogeneity of inputs and account
for imperfect competition using an approach on the lines of Olley and Pakes (1996) and
Levinsohn and Petrin (2000). In section 6 we disentangle the US productivity effect using
a two-step estimation procedure. Section 7 concludes.
2 Data Sources
Our sample is drawn from the Annual Respondents Database (ARD)5 which is the UK
equivalent of the US Longitudinal Respondents Database (LRD). It is a dataset made
available by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) based on information from the manda-
tory annual survey of UK businesses, called Annual Business Inquiry (ABI).6 The ARD
unit of observation is defined by the ONS as an ‘autonomous business unit’. We refer
to this level of observation as a ‘plant’.7 It is important to note that the ARD does not
consist of the complete population of all UK businesses. All businesses with more than
100 employees8 are sampled, but smaller businesses are sampled randomly. Only data on
British plants – i.e. excluding Northern Ireland – was made available to us. Each year
the sampled plants account for around 90% of total UK manufacturing employment.9 In
sum, our sample is an unbalanced panel of about 19,000 manufacturing plants which we
5More extensive descriptions of the ARD can be found in Criscuolo, Haskel and Martin (2003), Griffith
(1999) and Oulton (1997)
6Annual Census of Production until 1998.
7Some of these business units are spread across several sites and are therefore not plants in the strict
sense of the word. In about 80 percent of all cases a business unit is located entirely at a single mailing
address.
8In some years the threshold was 250 employees, for details we refer to Criscuolo, Haskel and Martin
(2003).
9To examine if our results are sensitive to the oversampling of larger plants we run regressions with
inverse sampling probabilities as weights. These results, available upon request from the authors, are not
qualitatively different from the unweighted results reported in the next section.
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observe annually for the years from 1996 to 2000.
The country of ownership of a foreign firm operating in the UK – and thus the ability
to identify foreign owned MNE plants in the UK – is provided in the ARD.10 While this
identifies foreign owned plants, until now it has not been possible to identify UK MNEs.
To do this we use the Annual Foreign Direct Investment (AFDI) register.
The AFDI is an annual survey of businesses which requests a detailed breakdown of
the financial flows between UK firms and their overseas parents or subsidiaries. The AFDI
is thus a survey run at the firm and not at the plant level. The AFDI register provides
the sampling frame of the AFDI and contains the population of all UK firms which are
engaging in or receiving foreign direct investment (FDI). The working definition of FDI
for this purpose is that the investment must give the investing firm a ‘significant’ amount
of control over the recipient firm. The ONS considers this to be the case if the investment
gives the investor a share of at least 10 percent of the recipient firm’s capital.
To conduct the AFDI, the ONS maintains a register which holds information on the
country of ownership of each foreign firm and on which UK firms have foreign subsidiaries
or branches.11 This register is designed to capture the universe of firms that are involved in
foreign direct investment abroad and in the UK. We consequently define as ‘multinational’
each plant in the ARD that is owned by a firm which appears in the AFDI register.12
A problem with the AFDI register is that information is not always up-to-date. If
a firm engages or receives FDI, it will only be included in the AFDI register after the
ONS learns from various sources, including commercial data and newspapers, that this
happened. Consequently, the register population has varied spuriously over the years with
the ONS’ success in identifying such firms. However, we believe that this problem does
not weaken the conclusions that can be drawn from our results. If some of the plants
10The ARD data is supplemented here with information from Dun&Bradstreet global “Who Owns
Whom” database. According to Dun&Bradstreet, the nationality of a plant is determined by the country
of residence of the global ultimate parent, i.e. is the topmost company of a world-wide hierarchical
relationship identified bottom-to-top using any company which owns more than 50% of the control (voting
stock, ownership shares) of another business entity.
11The ONS distinguishes between subsidiaries and branches as follows: a ‘subsidiary’ is a company
where the parent company holds more than 50% of the equity share capital; a ‘branch’ is a permanent
establishment as defined for UK corporation tax and double taxation relief purposes; companies where
the investing company holds between 10% and 50% of the equity share capital, i.e. does not have a
controlling interest but participates in the management, are defined as ‘associates’. The country of
ownership is identified using the nationality of the immediate owner, Office for National Statistics (2002)
p.120.
12Details of the procedure followed to merge the AFDI and the ARD are reported in Criscuolo and
Martin (2003).
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Table 1: Importance of MNE
(Average numbers and shares 1996-2000)
number of plants shares emp share va share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
pop. sample pop. sample pop. sample wghtd unwghtd
GB Non MNE 158,868 8,394 0.96 0.75 0.59 0.41 0.44 0.31
GB MNE 3,062 1,427 0.02 0.13 0.21 0.29 0.27 0.32
US 1,172 615 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.14 0.15 0.19
FOR 1,708 825 0.01 0.07 0.11 0.16 0.14 0.18
Notes: Figures reported are annual averages. Population refers to all businesses in the register, sample refers to businesses
in the ARD (all large plants plus a sample of smaller plants). Column 5 uses employment information from administrative
data for non-surveyed plants. Column 7 and 8 use value added at factor cost. Column 7 weights surveyed observations
using employment weights calculated as described in Appendix A to yield statistics representative of the whole
population. GB non MNE denotes domestic plants with no FDI; GB MNE is one for all domestic multinationals; US is
one for all plants owned by a US multinational and FOR is one for all plants owned by non US foreign multinationals.
Source: Authors’ calculations using matched ARD-AFDI data over the 1996-2000 period.
which we record as non-multinational are actually multinational plants and we still find
that multinationals are more productive than non-multinational plants then this means
that this result would be even stronger if we measured the status of all plants correctly.
3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows the number of multinational plants that we can identify in the population
and in the sample and their relevance in terms of employment and value added. Column
1 reports the number of domestic plants with no FDI, (defined as GB Non MNEs), British
MNEs (GB MNE), US MNEs (US) and non US foreign owned plants (FOR) in the whole
population. Column 2 shows the number of plants in each group for the sample of plants
surveyed by the ONS to compile the ARD. Columns 3 and 4 translate these numbers into
shares. Column 3 shows that 1 percent of all plants in Britain are US owned, almost as
much as all other foreign owned plants combined. Indeed, US MNEs represent more than
40 percent of all foreign owned plants in Britain ((615 + 825)/825). Similar figures hold
for the share in employment (column 5) and value added (column 7), where US owned
plants represent 47 and 51 percent of FDI, respectively. These figures are consistent with
the fact that the most productive companies are also likely to have the highest market
share. Also, since US MNEs are on average larger, the relative share of US MNEs in the
selected sample is much higher: whereas in the total population US MNEs take a share
of about 1 percent, in the sample the same figure rises to 5 percent.
Table 2 reports averages and standard deviations for relevant variables. Panel 1 shows
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Table 2: Summary Statistics in the 1996-2000 pooled sample
GB non MNE GB MNE US FOR
1 VA/Emp 27.96 36.87 46.57 43.10
(183.47) (39.30) (80.79) (51.43)
2 GO/Emp 76.55 105.35 146.23 156.39
(207.92) (132.22) (232.02) (283.73)
3 Mat/Emp 50.54 69.78 99.16 114.43
(85.04) (85.91) (163.67) (221.25)
4 K/Emp 38.23 65.43 85.54 108.92
(92.78) (73.07) (125.61) (366.37)
5 Employment 142.15 475.02 537.00 445.62
(264.51) (954.81) (1394.88) (1134.80)
6 AverageWage 17.25 21.35 24.13 23.40
(7.89) (10.13) (8.53) (8.21)
7 VA/Sales 0.43 0.40 0.38 0.33
(0.17) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Notes: Figures are unweighted averages over the sample period. Standard deviations in parenthesis. Figures in panels 1 to
4 and 6 are in thousands of pounds. Figures in panel 5 are head counts. The number of observations in all panels is
38,501. GB non MNE denotes domestic plants with no FDI; GB MNE is one for all domestic multinationals; US is one
for all plants owned by a US multinational and FOR is one for all plants owned by non US foreign multinationals.
Source: Authors’ calculations using matched ARD-AFDI data over the 1996-2000 period.
the US owned plants’ labour productivity lead: averaging over the whole manufacturing
sector and not controlling for industry we find that plants owned by US firms have an
advantage of 26 percent ((46.57 − 36.87)/36.87) over British MNEs and an advantage
of 8 percent ((46.57 − 43.10)/43.10) over other foreign MNEs. In terms of gross output
per employee (panel 2) the ranking changes: foreign non-US owned plants are the most
productive and in general the foreign advantage becomes more dramatic. Panels 3 and
4 suggest that the figures in panel 2 can be partly explained by the fact that non US
foreign owned plants have much higher material-to-labour and capital-to-labour ratios
than all other plants. Panel 5 shows that US plants are on average larger and pay higher
wages. This might imply that at least part of the US advantage is the consequence of scale
effects13 and employment of higher skilled workers. Thus, the US advantage might not
be due to technological or managerial superiority but simply to different input choices.
13Here we refer to scale effects at the plant level. In our study we cannot control for the scale of the
global operations of MNEs, e.g. we do not have information on ‘global employment’.
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Table 3: Relative productivity of MNE
(estimates of Equation 2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
dep. var lnV A
L
lnGO
L
US 0.349 0.144 0.076 0.045 0.044
(0.018)∗∗∗ (0.022)∗∗∗ (0.007)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗
FOR 0.261 0.055 0.041 0.010 0.009
(0.016)∗∗∗ (0.020)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.008) (0.008)
MNE 0.261 0.047 0.047
(0.015)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗
lnK
L
0.071 0.070 0.072
(0.003)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗
lnM
L
0.626 0.625 0.622
(0.005)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗
lnL -0.010 -0.014 -0.010
(0.002)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗
age 0.000
(0.001)
age2/10 -0.001
(0.001)
agecens -0.003
(0.007)
obs 38501 38501 38501 38501 38501
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, estimated allowing correlation between unobservables for plants in the same
firm. In columns 1-3 the dependent variable is log real value added (at factor cost) per employee. In columns 4-6
dependent variable is plant’s real gross output per employee. Both value added and gross output are deflated by 4-digit
annual output price deflators. Agecens equals one if the plant exists since 1980. All regressions include region and 4-digit
industry time interaction dummies. US equals one if a plant s owned by a US multinational, MNE is one for all plants
part of MNE firms and FOR is one for all plants owned by non US foreign multinationals. ∗ significantly different from
zero at the 10 percent level. ∗∗ significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. ∗∗∗ significantly different from zero
at the 1 percent level.
4 Foreign or Multinational Effect?
The labour productivity advantage of multinationals, US and non US, reported in row 1
of table 2 might reflect the fact the MNEs tend to operate in highly productive industries
and/or tend to cluster in particular regions with special geographical advantages.
Thus, we start our econometric analysis by controlling for interacted 4-digit industry
time fixed effects and regional dummies. The results of this exercise are reported in
column 1 of table 3, where we regress labour productivity, measured as real value added
per employee on 4-digit industry year dummy interactions, 10 regional dummies and two
ownership dummies US, which equals 1 when a plant is a subsidiary of a US multinational,
and FOR that takes value 1 when a plant is owned by a foreign, non US, corporation.
We find that US and other foreign owned plants are on average 42 percent and 30 per-
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Table 4: Robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lnGO
L
O-P
O-P,
const. µ
sectors
TFP obs
MNE 0.047 0.148 0.166 0.054 11826
(0.006)∗∗∗ (0.016)∗∗∗ (0.038)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗
US 0.044 0.065 0.110 0.033 2589
(0.008)∗∗∗ (0.023)∗∗∗ (0.062)∗ (0.006)∗∗∗
EUnorth 0.016 -0.031 0.024 -0.002 798
(0.012) (0.050) (0.152) (0.009)
EUsouth 0.012 -0.024 -0.094 -0.016 80
(0.025) (0.527) (0.204) (0.024)
France 0.011 -0.004 -0.059 0.005 452
(0.012) (0.049) (0.163) (0.011)
Germany -0.020 0.018 0.116 -0.024 523
(0.010)∗∗ (0.053) (0.143) (0.009)∗∗
Japan -0.022 -0.011 0.036 -0.033 364
(0.014) (0.072) (0.167) (0.013)∗∗∗
Netherlands 0.027 -0.041 -0.029 -0.021 385
(0.016) (0.042) (0.144) (0.012)∗
Tax -0.106 -0.194 -0.083 -0.069 75
(0.026)∗∗∗ (0.066)∗∗∗ (0.099) (0.022)∗∗∗
other -0.038 -0.093 -0.041 -0.050 136
(0.026) (0.052)∗ (0.134) (0.021)∗∗
otherEurope 0.062 -0.032 -0.004 0.013 338
(0.028)∗∗ (0.092) (0.111) (0.020)
otherOECD 0.055 -0.016 -0.065 0.019 222
(0.019)∗∗∗ (0.079) (0.165) (0.016)
obs 38501 37850 10326 38253 .
Notes: All regressions include a quadratic polynomial in age, age dummy, time and region dummies not reported in the
table for brevity. Columns 1 and 4: robust standard errors in parentheses, estimated allowing correlation between
unobservables for plants in the same firm. Columns 2 and 3: bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. MNEs takes
value 1 if plant is part of an MNE group. US is one if the MNE group is US-owned. Similarly for the other country
groups. Details on the country group classifications are in the appendix A. In column 1 the dependent variable is log real
gross output per employee. Column 1 estimates a Cobb-Douglas production function. Unreported regressors include log
capital per employee, log materials per employee, log employment, and time 4-digit industry interaction dummies.
Columns 2 and 3 report the second stage estimates using a modified version of Olley and Pakes approach described in
section 5. Column 3 restricts the sample to plants in sectors where the test of constant markups µ could not be rejected
(see appendix C). In Column 4 the dependent variable is log real TFP calculated using a factor share method as described
in section 5.5. ∗ significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level. ∗∗ significantly different from zero at the 5
percent level. ∗∗∗ significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. Column 5 row 1 reports the number of
observations for all MNEs in the sample, row 2 reports the number of observations for US MNEs, row 3 to 13 report the
number of observations from MNEs in each country group reported in column 1.
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cent respectively more productive than British domestic plants.14 This sizeable advantage
is in line with previous results for Great Britain (e.g. Oulton (2000). But, how much of
this advantage is due to these plants being part of a multinational enterprise? Column 2
answers this question by including a multinational dummy MNE that is one whenever a
plant is owned by a multinational firm. If this multinational is US owned the dummy US
will be one as well. Consequently, in column 2 the US coefficient measures the advantage
of US MNEs over British MNEs and the FOR coefficient represents the advantage of non
US foreign owned subsidiaries over British MNEs.15 The coefficients’ estimates reported
in column 2 show that MNEs enjoy a productivity advantage of 30 percent, the US have
a significant additional advantage of 15 percent, while non US foreign owned plants enjoy
a smaller but significant 5 percent advantage relative to their British counterparts.
Table 2 has shown that both US and foreign MNEs have much higher capital intensity
than UK firms. This suggests that part of the observed foreign ownership advantage could
be driven by this higher capital intensity. To examine this we need to estimate total
factor productivity (TFP). The literature has suggested a variety of different approaches
to estimating plant level TFP. We start in this section by estimating a Cobb-Douglas
production function by OLS. Thus, we assume that output, Q, is produced using the
technology
qit = γ
∑
z∈Z
αzxzit + ait (1)
where qit is the logarithm of output produced at plant i in period t, γ is the returns to
scale coefficient, Z is a set of production factors – labour, physical capital and intermediate
inputs – αz are the production function parameters, and ait is TFP. We examine if TFP
systematically varies between various types of MNEs and domestic plants by estimating
the following equation
rit − pIt − xLit = γ
∑
z∈Z αz(xzit − xLit) + γxLit
+β1USJ(i,t) + β2FORJ(i,t) + β3MNEJ(i,t)
+θIt + ψR + εit
(2)
14The percentage differences reported in the text are calculated from the coefficients of the dummy
variables in Table 3 according to the formula diff = (eβ
dummy − 1) e.g. for the US 0.42 = (e0.349 − 1).
15The performance of US MNEs relative to domestic plants can, therefore, be calculated as the sum
of the coefficients on MNE and US and the advantage of other foreign-owned plants as the sum of the
coefficients on MNE and FOR.
10
i.e. we regress deflated revenue, rit − pIt, per worker, xLit, on indexes of inputs,
dummies referring to ownership16 and interacted dummies, θIt, controlling for 4 digit
sectors time effects and 10 regional dummies ψR to control for location effects within
Britain. This approach – although standard practice – raises a number of concerns,
such as imperfect competition, endogeneity, the lack of plant specific price indices etc.
We discuss these issues and their importance for our results in the following section, and
argue that the qualitative results do not change relative to the simple regression described
in equation 2. We therefore start by discussing these results, reported in the last three
columns of Table 3.
In column 3 – besides capital and material intensity and regional and industry time
fixed effects – we only include US and non US foreign ownership dummies and find that
US owned plants are significantly the most productive plants in Britain enjoying a strong
and significant TFP advantage of almost 8 percent (with a coefficient of 7.6 as shown
by row 1 of column 3) and non US foreign owned plants follow with an advantage of 4
percent relative to the reference group of all British plants. This confirms previous results
(e.g. Griffith (1999), Oulton (2000) and Harris (1999)).
Column 4 shows that once we include a separate dummy for being part of an MNE,
the advantage of non US foreign MNEs drops to an insignificant 1 percent. US plants
maintain a significant advantage of 4.5 percent relative to British MNEs, who, in turn,
are 4.8 percent more productive than non MNE plants. This result shows that only part
of the US productivity advantage is actually a multinational effect.
Finally, column 5 extends the results of the previous column: it accounts for age effects
by including a quadratic polynomial in age,17 to account for possible differences due to
the plants’ life cycle, learning effects and/or the age of physical assets. The coefficient
of US MNE remains virtually unchanged, while the foreign non US advantage relative to
GB MNEs is a non significant 1 percent. Finally, MNEs are on average 4.6 percent more
productive than British non MNEs.
Our results thus suggest the following. Firstly, controlling for capital intensity, ma-
terial usage, scale and age effects, US MNEs are the productivity leaders, with British
and non-US foreign MNEs having a comparable productivity advantage with respect to
16USJ(i,t), for example, would be equal to 1 if plant i is owned in period t by US firm J.
17Since our age variable is left censored in 1980, we include an age censoring dummy. We have tried
alternative specifications for the age effect. We also experimented with including age categories and the
logarithm of age which leads to the same conclusions as obtained under the current specification.
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British plants that are not part of an MNE. Secondly, much of the US and all of the non
US foreign productivity advantage found in previous studies18 appears to be an MNE
effect.
5 Are our results robust?
Several issues arise when estimating Equation 2. These include our simple grouping
of countries into US and all other non UK countries and issues about estimation and
interpretation of TFP, such as the perfect competition assumption underlying equation
2, the inflexibility of our production technology and endogeneity problems. We address
these in this section. Our main tool to account for endogeneity is a modified version of
the framework suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996), which is new to the literature.
5.1 Country grouping
The aggregation of all non-US foreign owned plants in one group might hide considerable
heterogeneity. In column 1 of table 4, we differentiate the ‘non US Foreign’ group further
into various country groups.19 We see that US MNEs are still the productivity leaders
together with Norway, Switzerland and other OECD countries (mainly Canada and Aus-
tralia), but as a first glance at the following columns shows, only the US leadership is
robust to further checks.
5.2 Imperfect competition
As pointed out in the previous section, an implicit requirement for the foreign dummies
to reflect a purely technological advantage is perfect competition. To examine the im-
plications of removing the perfect competition assumption we find it useful to follow the
model originally introduced by Klette and Griliches (1996). Start by simply recalling the
definition of deflated revenue, our actual observed dependent variable at the plant level:
rit − pIt = qit + pit − pIt (3)
18cited in footnote 2.
19details of the country groups classification can be found in Appendix A.
12
i.e. revenue is quantity times prices (all variables in logs), qit + pit, since we do not
observe prices at the plant level, we deflate nominal sales using (four-digit) sector level
price deflators pIt. Given that plant level prices are not observed we need some way of
controlling for them with variables we actually observe. This can be done by specifying
a demand function which links prices to output. A possible specification of the demand
function is (see also Melitz (2000)):
Qit =
(
Pit
PIt
)−η
Λη−1it ΘIt (4)
where subscripts i denote firm and I industry; Λit is a firm specific demand shock, η
is the industry demand elasticity and ΘIt is a sectoral shock to demand.
20 Taking logs of
Equation 4 and inverting gives:
pit − pIt = 1
µ
λit − 1
η
qit +
1
η
θIt (5)
where µ = 1
1− 1
η
is the markup of price over marginal cost implied by profit maximizing
behaviour and lower case letters denote logarithms.
Combining equations 5 and 1 with 3 gives:
rit − pIt = γ
µ
∑
z∈Z
αzxzit + ωit +
1
η
θIt (6)
where ωit =
1
µ
(ait + λit). Equation 6 is the equivalent of Equation 2 under imperfect
competition. A number of things are worth pointing out. Firstly, – as stressed by Klette
and Griliches (1996) – the interpretation of the estimated coefficients on the various
production factors changes: they are now all divided through by the markup coefficient µ.
Secondly – and more importantly for our purpose – without plant level price information
it is no longer possible to regard TFP, here denoted as ωit as a shift parameter relating
solely to technical efficiency.21 Rather, ωit =
1
µ
(ait + λit) is a composite of both technology
shocks ait, demand shocks λit and mark-up µ. In the light of equation 6, how do we
interpret the MNE, US and FOR dummies? Let us start by assuming that within
4-digit sectors µ is constant. In this case a higher ωit for US and MNE plants reflects
better product quality or consumer valuation, λit, and/or higher technical efficiency, ait.
20This demand function can be derived by assuming monopolistic competition a` la Dixit-Stiglitz (see
Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) in the product market.
21Melitz (2000) stresses this point.
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However, as some recent papers22 have pointed out, revenue based measures of TFP (ωit)
might vary between plants for reasons other than product quality or consumer valuation
and technical efficiency. In particular, variations in market power – i.e. µ not being
constant across plants in the same industry– might explain some of the variation. Market
power might well be positively related to the composite of technical efficiency and product
quality. This would introduce a bias to TFP estimates which is negatively correlated with
true TFP.23 In the worst case – if e.g. market power derives from government regulation
and restrictions to entry for example – there might be no systematic relation between
market power and biases to TFP estimates.
We have three reasons which suggest that our results are not driven by market power
effects. Firstly, while there are surely some sectors of the UK economy in which govern-
ment regulation rather than competitive pricing determine the market share of different
companies24 it is hard to believe that this is a general phenomenon in the manufacturing
sector as a whole. Consequently we expect, that variations in market power are gener-
ally driven by variations in product quality or consumer valuation (λit).
25 Following the
argument in the last paragraph, the biases from variations in market power would then
strengthen our main conclusions: if we tend to underestimate TFP of the better plants
such as US MNEs but we still find that they are significantly better, then the result
would be even more clear-cut if we would correct for these biases. Moreover if regulation
favours certain firms then this should in particular lead to advantages for domestic firms
rather than MNE firms in general or US firms in particular. Secondly, large variations
in market power might be a particular problem when comparing MNEs with non MNEs.
However, this should be less of an issue when comparing (British) MNEs, with other (US
and other foreign) MNEs. Thirdly, we have devised a simple test based on over identifying
restrictions of the assumption that µ in equation 6 is constant.26 The hypothesis that µ
22see for example Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2003), Syverson (2004) and Katayama, Lu and
Tybout (2003).
23If in equation 6 the coefficients on factor inputs vary because of variation in market power across plants
(µit) but our estimation model uses fixed coefficients µ¯t ∈ [min{µit};max{µit}] and Cov(µit, ait+λit) > 0,
then for plants with high ait + λit we attribute too much output variation to production factors. More
intuitively, this is the case because our regression model does not control for the fact that for plants with
larger µ an increase in factors would depress prices more.
24Sectors where this might be the case include petroleum and nuclear fuel (SIC 23) and Utilities (SIC
40/41) which we exclude from the analysis.
25A positive relationship between market power and consumer valuation is also the finding of Foster
et al. (2003) who investigated the issue on one of the few productivity datasets which includes firm level
prices.
26The details of this test are reported in Appendix C
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is constant is rejected in a large number of sectors. However, if we re-compute our earlier
regressions for the sectors in which a constant µ cannot be rejected, i.e. in those sectors
in which market power should not affect the estimated ranking, we come to the same
qualitative conclusions on the relative position of various groups of MNEs.
5.3 A more flexible production function allowing for imperfect
competition
An additional worry might be that a log linear production function is inappropriate.
Klette (1999) has proposed a methodology that integrates a flexible production function
into an imperfectly competitive setting. The starting point is a homogenous differential
production function:
Qit = Ait [f (Xit)]
γ (7)
whereXit is a vector of factor inputs and f(·) is a linear homogenous general differentiable
function. Using the mean value theorem we can write output relative to the median firm
as:
q˜it = a˜it +
Z∑
z=1
αzx˜zit (8)
where small letters with a tilde denote log deviations from the median plant (M) in a
given year,27 and the αz represent the partial derivatives of the log production function
evaluated at some point X¯it in the convex hull spanned by Xit and XMt, so that
αz = γfz(X¯it)
X¯zit
f(X¯it)
(9)
where fz(·) represents the partial derivative of f(·) with respect to production factor z.
The first order condition of profit maximization implies that
Pitγ
Qit
f(Xit)
fz(Xit) = µWzit (10)
27e.g. q˜it = lnQit − lnQMt
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i.e. prices are such that the marginal value product is µ times the marginal cost W of
each factor. Our demand function implies that
µ =
1
1− 1
η
As pointed out by Klette (1999), equation 10 can only be expected to hold for production
factors which are easily adjustable. We assume that this is the case for intermediates and
labour, but not for capital so that we get:
αz = µ
WzXzit
PitQit
= µszit (11)
where szit is the revenue share of factor z and z ∈ {L,M}. Further, because of homo-
geneity of degree γ of the production function we get
αK = γ − αL − αM (12)
and therefore in equation 8:
q˜it = a˜it + µv˜iit + γk˜it + a˜it (13)
where
v˜iit =
∑
z 6=K
s¯jt(x˜zit − k˜it) (14)
is an index of all variable factors. These results allow us to rewrite 6 as28
r˜it − v˜iit = γ
µ
k˜it + ω˜it (15)
The variable factor index v˜iit can be directly observed from the data, since all that is
required are variables for factor inputs and revenue shares of the factors.29
28All aggregate expressions such as pIt and θIt in 6 disappear because the equation is now written in
terms of deviations from the median plant in the sector.
29Equation 9 suggests that we should evaluate the derivatives – and thus the factor shares – at ‘some
point in the convex hull’. Since we do not know the exact location of this point and of course we do not
know the functional form of the derivative, we follow common practice and approximate by averaging
over the factor share at plant i and the factor share at the median plant M to calculate the shares in
viit; i.e. s¯it = sMt+sit2 . See also Baily et al. (1992) on this.
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5.4 Accounting for endogeneity
Equation 15 suggests that the final element required to derive an estimate for ω˜it is to
find an estimate of βK =
γ
µ
, the ratio between the scale and the markup coefficient. Since
plant level capital stocks – like all other inputs – are presumably highly correlated with
ω˜it this is not a trivial undertaking.
30 We address this problem using a modified version
of the approach of Olley and Pakes (1996). Following them we assume that ω˜it evolves as
a first order Markov Process:
ω˜it = E{ω˜it|ω˜it−1}+ ν˜it (16)
We also assume that capital is only correlated with the expected component of ω˜it but
not with ν˜it.
31 Then we can estimate equation 15 if we find a control for E{ω˜it|ω˜it−1}.
In Appendix B we show that conditional on capital and assuming that markups µ are
constant across firms in a narrowly defined sector (four digit) there is a monotone rela-
tionship between profits – defined as revenue minus variable costs – and ω˜. Consequently
we can invert the profit function and write
ω˜it = φω
(
k˜it, Π˜it
)
(17)
We do not know what functional form E{ω˜it|·} takes, but in equation 17 we have found
a way to express it in terms of observables so that we can rewrite 15 as
r˜it − v˜iit = γ
µ
k˜it + g(k˜it−1, Π˜it−1) + ν˜it (18)
where g(·) = E{ω˜it|φ(·)} is a function of unknown form. To estimate 18 we can either
employ a semi-parametric procedure or approximate g(·) by a third order polynomial
which, for simplicity, is our strategy. An estimator for ω˜it can then be obtained as
ˆ˜ωit = r˜it − v˜iit −
(̂
γ
µ
)
k˜it (19)
Compared to Olley and Pakes (1996) the main innovation of our approach is to use
30see Griliches and Mairesse (1995) for a summary on the endogeneity problem and potential solutions.
31Olley and Pakes assume that investment in t can only be used for production in t + 1. We follow a
different strategy. We assume that investment is predetermined. Although this would be problematic in
the Olley and Pakes methodology, it does not affect our estimation procedure.
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profits and not investment as predictor for ω˜it. This has a number of advantages. Firstly,
a major criticism of the Olley and Pakes framework is that investment might be a very
poor predictor of the fixed component of ω˜it.
32 If firms are essentially in the steady state
– and the capital stock in period t reflects the firm’s knowledge about ω˜it at t− 1 – then
the variation in investment reflects primarily adjustments to news about ω˜ from period t.
Our approach – similarly to Levinsohn and Petrin ( 2000) who use material inputs instead
of investment – does not suffer from this problem. Plants with high ω˜ will have higher
profits whether or not they are in the steady state. Secondly, differently from Levinsohn
and Petrin, we can identify all relevant parameters from a moment condition on capital
without having to assume separability in intermediate inputs or relying on instrumental
variable techniques. Also, we do not require any assumptions on the substitutability
between variable production factors.33
Finally, to examine if measured TFP (ω˜it) is systematically different between various
types of MNEs we run a regression of estimated ω˜it on our ownership dummies.
ˆ˜ωit = β1USJ(i,t) + β2FORJ(i,t) + β3MNEJ(i,t) + ε˜it (20)
Column 2 of table 4 reports the results of this exercise. We see that controlling for
endogeneity and allowing for imperfect competition, non constant returns to scale as well
as for a very flexible production technology has no qualitative and only small quantitative
implications for our results. Column 3 shows estimates computed with the same method,
but including in the second stage regression – equation 20 – only those sectors for which
our test34 of constant markups µ could not be rejected. This suggests the same qualitative
conclusions as before.
5.5 Other approaches to TFP estimation
The simplest way to handle the endogeneity problem in production function estimation
is to follow a factor share approach which involves no regression analysis at all. In table
4 – for completeness – we also report our results from using such an approach. Following
Baily et al. (1992) and adopting a strategy similar to the one used to calculate the variable
32see Griliches and Mairesse (1995).
33For a more detailed discussion of our approach see Martin (2003).
34as described in Appendix C
18
factor index viit in the previous subsection
35 we calculate TFP as
ω˜BHCit = r˜it − s¯Mitm˜it − s¯Litl˜it + (1− s¯Mit − s¯Lit)k˜it (21)
Column 4 shows that even under this specification our main results of a general MNE
advantage and a further US advantage prevail. Note, however, that the point estimates
found for the MNE and US effects are considerably smaller compared to results in columns
1 and 2. This is a consequence of imposing γ
µ
= 1 which we implicity do in equation 21.
If we use the TFP estimation strategy described in the previous sections we typically
find γ
µ
< 1 suggesting the prevalence of imperfect competition. Now if there is a positive
correlation between performance and capital input (Cov(ωit, kit) > 0) then standard TFP
assigns too much of the variation in rit − viit (see equation 15) to capital so that better
performing plants look worse than they are.36
To summarize, the results shown in table 3 seem to be robust: US MNEs are the most
productive with British MNEs and foreign non US MNEs alternating each other in the
second position. British plants that are not part of an MNE are the least productive. In
the next section we shed more light on the factors, which drive these differences.37
6 Explaining the US productivity leadership
In the previous sections we have been able to establish two main results. Firstly, plants
owned by MNEs are on average more productive than non MNE plants and secondly,
plants owned by US MNEs are more productive than all other MNEs. Using the longi-
tudinal dimension of the current data we try to distinguish between three hypotheses on
the sources of the MNE and US advantages.
35This approach is equivalent to imposing γµ = 1 which rules out imperfect competition and nonconstant
returns to scale.
36An alternative method to estimate TFP controlling for the endogeneity of inputs would be Difference
GMM (Arellano and Bond (1991)) and System GMM (Blundell and Bond (1998)). We attempted to use
these estimation methods on our sample, but we encountered two problems: firstly the time period of our
sample is too short, 5 years, with less than 7 percent of the plants observed over the whole time period;
secondly, due to the fact that the ARD surveys small plants randomly, only 12 percent of the plants have
continuous time series information.
37Other unreported robustness checks include weighted regressions and regressions that control for
unobserved skill level in the firm. In the latter we include in equation 2 plant average wage as a proxy
for the average skill level of workers; we cannot further distinguish between average wage for operatives
and average wage for administrative employees unlike previous studies (e.g. Griffith and Simpson (2001))
because since 1996 this information has not been reported in the ARD.
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Table 5: Sources of MNE and US advantage
(Productivity is residual of gross output regression)
(1) (2) (3)
all change to MNE currently domestic
MNE 0.007 0.007 0.007
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
ever MNE firm 0.066 0.018
(0.013)∗∗∗ (0.012)
ever MNE plant 0.155 0.160
(0.025)∗∗∗ (0.025)∗∗∗
ever US firm -0.002 -0.023
(0.017) (0.020)
ever US plant 0.098 0.120 0.121
(0.016)∗∗∗ (0.032)∗∗∗ (0.024)∗∗∗
ever other for firm 0.017 0.009
(0.014) (0.019)
ever other for plant 0.048 0.017 0.035
(0.015)∗∗∗ (0.026) (0.020)∗
green dom -0.007 0.022 0.001
(0.010) (0.033) (0.012)
green mult 0.037 0.081
(0.016)∗∗ (0.057)
green US 0.006 -0.087
(0.030) (0.072)
green other 0.001 -0.010
(0.024) (0.072)
obs 38501 2501 25558
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Row 1 (MNE) reports first-stage estimates of the going global
effect. Row 2 and below: coefficients and standard errors are from the second-stage of our estimation procedure.
Dependent variable is fixed effects estimated in the first step. ever MNE firm equals 1 if the plant belongs at time t to a
firm which is MNE. ever MNE plant is 1 if the plant has ever been owned by a MNE over the course of the sample
period. Similarly for the ever US and ever FOR dummies. green dummies take value one for all plants that are
established during the course of the sample period (1996-2000), green GB non MNE is one for plants owned by
domestic firms when established. green MNE is one for plants owned by MNE firms when established. green US
(green FOR) is one for plants owned by US (other foreign) firms when established. Column 1 use the whole sample of
38,501 observations. Column 2 only includes plants that incur a change in status over the period they are present in the
sample. Column 3 only keeps observations of non MNE plants and of MNE plants when owned by non MNE firms.
∗ significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level. ∗∗ significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. ∗∗∗
significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level.
A first hypothesis is that plants owned by MNEs might be more productive because
multinational firms takeover the best plants in any country. We call this the plant picking
effect. This might be because multinational corporations have more resources to finance
takeover activity or because they are simply better at spotting top performing plants.
A second hypothesis is that multinational firms are characterised by superior shared
assets that improve the performance of any plant they takeover.38 Examples include
international distribution networks, special management techniques, patents, blueprints,
trade secrets, and reputation effects. We refer to this as the best firm effect.
Finally, plants owned by firms that start investing abroad might experience produc-
tivity improvements as a direct consequence of FDI, because of, for example, firm-level
scale economies, cheaper options to hedge against exchange rate risk, technology sourcing
38we can think of this effect as the ‘ownership specific’ factors in Dunning’s explanation of FDI or the
‘knowledge capital’ of the firm in Markusen.
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Table 6: Status changes in the data
(Transitions in ownership and MNE status in sample 1996-2000)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GB non MNE GB MNE US FOR
Status changes
GB Non MNE 11164 589 225 304
GB MNE 251 3170 101 46
US 155 62 1290 48
FOR 138 42 26 1857
Status changes with ownership change
GB Non MNE 1511 255 225 304
GB MNE 164 51 101 46
US 155 62 131 48
FOR 138 42 26 246
Notes: GBnonMNE denotes domestic plants with no FDI; GBMNE is one for all domestic multinationals; US is one for
all plants owned by a US multinational and FOR is one for all plants owned by non US foreign multinationals. The table
reports in panel one the number of plants that change their MNE status; in panel two the subset of these that also
experienced an ownership change. For example Row 1 Column 2 reports that there are 589 transitions from GB non MNE
to GB MNE. Row 5 Column 2 reports that in 255 cases these transitions also involved a takeover. Number of observations
in the sample is 38,501. The period considered is 1996-2000. Source: Authours’ calculation using the ARD AFDI matched
data.
from abroad or other learning effects. We call this the going global effect.
We represent these hypotheses formally as follows.39 Productivity, Prodit, of plant i
at time t can be written as40:
Prodit = αi + ζt,J(i,t) + εit (22)
where ζt,J(i,t) = ζJ(i,t) + βMNEMNEJ(i,t); i.e. productivity can be decomposed in an
effect ζt,J(i,t) due to the parent firm of plant i at time t and a plant specific effect αi.
41
ζt,J(i,t) is then decomposed further in a time invariant firm specific effect ζJ(i,t) and an
effect which allows a causation from becoming multinational to productivity, βMNE. In
this setting the best firm effect can be represented as
E{ζJ(i,t)|MNEeverJ = 1} > E{ζJ(i,t)|MNEeverJ = 0} (23)
where MNEeverJ is a time invariant dummy variable that is equal to one if firm J is a
multinational, British42 or foreign, i.e. for MNEs we expect a higher firm fixed effects
39For simplicity at this stage we do not separate the MNE group further into separate US and foreign
other (FOR). We reintroduce those in the empirical analysis below.
40In principle we can decompose any productivity measure in this way. In our actual estimations below
we use TFP calculated as the residual from equation 2 as reported in column 5 of table 3.
41For simplicity we abstract from differences between various types of MNEs.
42Note that, for a given firm, MNEeverJ is time invariant characteristic. So for a UK MNE it would be
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than for other firms. The plant picking effect, on the other hand, can be represented as
E{αi|MNEeveri = 1} > E{αi|MNEeveri = 0} (24)
where MNEeveri is a dummy that is equal to one if plant i is being owned at some point
in the sample by a multinational firm in the periods when this firm is actually investing
abroad.43 Finally, the going global effect, is represented as βMNE > 0. To explain how we
identify these various effects from our data we introduce an example in figure 1.
Figure 1: An example
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Suppose our sample consists of 6 plants44 which are owned by 3 different firms (A, B
and C). We observe them for two periods, t and t + 1. In period t firms A and B are
domestic, whereas firm C is an MNE. In period 2 firm B starts investing abroad and thus
becomes an MNE whereas A stays domestic.45 Moreover, we have the following takeover
events: plant 2 is acquired by C and plant 4 is sold off to firm A by firm B before it starts
investing abroad.46 How can we differentiate between the various MNE effects discussed
earlier with the variation in this example? Consider first the plant picking effect. The one
plant in the example that was taken over by an MNE is plant 2. If we found that in year
equal to one even in the years where it has not yet started investing abroad.
43This latter qualification is of relevance for British MNEs in periods where they have not yet started
investing abroad. Plants which they sell or close down before investing abroad would be classified as non
MNE plants owned by an MNE.
44numbered 1 to 6 in figure 1
45In terms of our earlier dummies we would thus have MNEeverA = 0, MNE
ever
B = 1 (both, in year t
and t+1) and MNEeverC = 1
46Consequently MNEever1 = 0 and MNE
ever
4 = 0 whereas for all other plants MNE
ever
i = 1 ∀i =
2, 3, 5, 6.
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t plant 2 had a higher productivity than plant 1 this would be evidence of a plant picking
effect. To examine the existence of best firm effects we can compare the productivity of
plant 2 in year t + 1 relative to year t. If its productivity increases after it is taken over
by firm C this would be evidence of best firm effect.47 Finally, for the going global effect
we have to look at firm B and examine if the productivity of its plant 3 increases from t
to t+ 1.
How do we implement this econometrically? Our estimation strategy proceeds in two
steps. In the first step our objective is to obtain a consistent estimate of βMNE. Given the
assumptions of our model, the source of endogeneity is the potential correlation between
the unobserved effects αi and ζJ and the variable of interest MNEJ(i,t).
48 Note that if
we take deviations of the dependent and explanatory variables from the mean across all
observations of a specific firm plant combination, the two fixed effects vanish:
x˜it = xit − 1
#it [J(i, t)]
∑
τ s.t.J(i,τ)=J(i,t)
xiτ (25)
where #it [·] is a function that returns the number of periods plant i is owned by the
firm J(i, t). This corresponds to the fixed effects transformation where the cross sectional
units are not the plants nor the firms but each firm-plant combination in the dataset.
Consequently, running a least squares regression on
P˜ rodit = ˜MNEJ(i,t)β + ε˜it (26)
will give us a consistent estimate of βMNE.
49 This, in turn, can be used to obtain an
47Equally, we could look if the productivity of plant 4 decreases once it is taken over by A in period
t+ 1.
48Note that we are assuming E(εit|MNEJ(i,t), ζJ(i,t), αi) = 0, i.e., conditional on the fixed effects,
changes in MNE status are not correlated with the time varying shocks. We discuss this assumption in
more detail later in this section.
49One crucial assumption required is that the change in MNE status is not correlated with the time
varying part of the error term. Thus, we are implicitly assuming that the timing of the MNE status
change is exogenous. A scenario where this might be violated is the following: plants could have a higher
probability of being taken over in years where they suffer from idiosyncratic large negative shocks. To
examine the relevance of this scenario we run probit regressions of the probability of changing status to
MNE on time dummies and TFP growth in the previous year. The results show that productivity growth
is not significantly correlated with the probability of being taken over by an MNE. Also, since we do not
have good instruments for changes in MNE status we thought of controlling for the endogeneity of MNE
status changes using GMM methods. However, we cannot use these estimation methods as explained in
footnote 36.
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estimate of the fixed effects for all firm-plant combinations
̂ζJ(i,t) + αi = Prodit − βˆMNEMNEJ(i,t) (27)
Our second stage proceeds by running a regression of the predicted fixed effects on the
MNEeverJ and MNE
ever
i dummies:
̂ζJ(i,t) + αi = βeverJ MNEeverJ(i,t) + βeveri MNEeveri + υit (28)
The plant picking effect is in this setting represented as βeveri > 0 and the best firm effect
as βeverJ > 0.
Table 5 shows results from this regression exercise. Start by considering column 1
where we regress both stages on the complete sample. Note first that, as in section
4, we control separately for US MNEs and other foreign effects with dummies that are
constructed according to the example of MNEeverJ and MNE
ever
i . Moreover, we include
a set of dummies that are equal to one if a plant is setup as a greenfield investment
during our sample period by either a domestic or an MNE firm.50 This is to control for
a potentially important source of heterogeneity in the data that could bias our estimate
of the best firm effect: if any MNE’s shared assets’ effects could only be fully realised
in plants which are setup as greenfields by multinationals then ignoring these greenfield
dummies would bias our firm effects downwards. Consider now the results in column 1.
Firstly, row 1 reports the coefficient βMNE estimated in the first step. The positive but
insignificant coefficient’s estimate of 0.007 suggests that there is no strong going global
effect.51 Row 2 and 3 show that the MNE advantage seems to be due to both a plant
picking effect and a best firm effect. We find significant coefficients’ estimates of 0.066
and 0.155, respectively. Looking at row 4 and 5 we also have evidence that the additional
US advantage is a consequence of plant picking rather than a best firm effect: plants
that are at some point US owned have an average advantage of about 10 percent over all
other MNE plants. Row 7 shows a significantly positive foreign non-US plant effect of 4.8
percent, which is lower than the US plant effect.
Finally, rows 8 to 11 report the ‘greenfield’ effects. Row 9 shows that plants that are
50The reference category for this set of dummy variables are the plants which were set up before our
sample started so that we do not know who set them up.
51This first row result is the same in all columns, because the various columns only differ with respect
to the second stage regression
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setup by MNEs enjoy a 3.7 percent advantage relative to non greenfield domestic plants,
significant at the 5 percent level; row 10 and 11 show that there is no additional advantage
from being setup by a US or a foreign MNE.
What could be a potential concern with our estimates in column 1? Note that in terms
of the example in figure 1 the MNE firm coefficient, βeverJ ,
52 is calculated as a weighted
average of all observations of plants currently owned by an MNE firm minus a weighted
average of observations of all plants that are not owned by an MNE.53
Thus, βeverJ could be high for two reasons. Firstly, if plants such as 3, 5 and 6 which
throughout the sample period are owned by multinationals are very productive or secondly,
if plants such as 2 which change their ownership over the course of our sample had a strong
increase in productivity after being taken over by an MNE.54 To examine which of the two
is more relevant is interesting because it gives us an idea of the time span which might
be necessary for MNEs to increase the productivity of the acquired plants. Note, that a
particular characteristic of plants such as 5 and 6 is that they have been owned by an
MNE for longer than plants such as 2.55 Consequently, in column 2 we restrict our sample
for the second stage regression to MNE plants which had a transition from domestic to
MNE over the course of our sample.56 If we still find significant MNE firm effects this is
an indication that MNE firms are very quick in improving the productivity of acquired
plants. However, in column 2 the MNE firm dummy reduces to less than a third relative
to column 1 – from 0.066 to 0.018 – and is only borderline significant.57
Equally, there might be an issue with our estimates of the plant picking effects in
column 1. The MNE plant picking effect – and by analogy the US and other foreign plant
picking effects – are computed as the weighted average of all observations from MNEever
plants minus a weighted average of all observations from non MNEever plants.58
Therefore, our calculations also include observations from periods in which some of
52And by analogy all other firm coefficients in column 1.
53i.e. in terms of the example in figure 1, the best firm effect is calculated as Weighted Average
{2t+1, 3t, 3t+1, 4t, 5t, 5t+1, 6t, 6t+1}− Weighted Average {1t, 1t+1, 2t, 4t+1} where (i, t) denotes a plant-
year tuple.
54or if plants such as 4 had a dramatic drop in productivity after being sold off.
55Since we have a sample period of 5 years and for plants such as 2 we must observe at least one
takeover, the longest time such a plant could be owned by an MNE is 4 years.
56Like example plant 2.
57In unreported results, we explore this issue in more detail. We find that if we restrict this analysis
to plants that we observe for at least two years after takeover, i.e. to 692 observations, the MNE firm
dummy coefficient is estimated to be 0.035 with a bootstrapped standard error of 0.022.
58Thus, in terms of our example, the plant picking effect is calculated as
WeightedAverage{2t, 2t+1, 3t, 3t+1, 5t, 5t+1, 6t, 6t+1} −WeightedAverage{1t, 1t+1, 4t, 4t+1}
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the plants are owned by an MNEever firm.59 Thus, the robustness of our plant effects
estimator depends on our ability to correctly control for any firm effect that the plants
are subject to in those periods. An easy way to check our results is to restrict the second
stage regression to the sample of observations in which plants are owned by non MNE
firms.60 This is done in column 3. As in column 1 we find strong MNE and US plant
picking effects suggesting that MNEs and especially US MNEs pick the better plants. In
contrast to column 1, we cannot find an additional plant picking effect for plants which
are taken over by non US foreign firms.
What other potential concerns arise concerning this analysis? A strong assumption
in our identification strategy is that all unobserved heterogeneity can be captured by
our two fixed effects. There might be important deviations from this model. For example
plants might be acquired by MNEs not according to their productivity level but according
to their future growth potential. To investigate this in more detail we would require a
dataset covering a longer time period than we have at present. Also note that if this
issue is important it would lead in our framework to an overestimation of the firm effects,
especially in column 2 where we focus on plants that were taken over by MNEs during
the sample period.
Another possible source of endogeneity is related to the possibility that the takeover
by an MNE is correlated with time varying shocks as well as the plant fixed effects. For
example, the transition to foreign ownership might not only depend on fixed characteristics
of plants but also on temporary negative shocks which make the plant temporarily weak
and thus a target of e.g. a hostile foreign takeover. Alternatively, one might think of a case
in which the MNE gains interest in a particular plant because of a positive productivity
shock. It is therefore not clear in which direction the bias will go.
Apart from our estimation strategy, a general concern might be that our dataset does
not have sufficient movement of firms between multinational states and of plants between
different types of firms. This is the topic of table 6 which reports the occurrence of all
these changes in our dataset. The upper panel reports the number of status changes for
each possible transition between GB non MNE, GB MNEs, US MNEs and Non US Foreign
MNEs (FOR). For example the cell in row 1, column 2 reports that in our sample there
59in terms of the example these are (2, t+ 1) and (4, t)
60i.e. identify the plant effect fromWeightedAverage{(2, t)}−WeightedAverage{(1, t), (1, t+1), (4, t+
1)}.
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are 589 transitions from GB non MNEs to GB MNEs. The lower panel reports only the
number of status changes that also involved an ownership change. Therefore, the cell in
row 5 column 2 reports that 255 of the 589 British plants that became multinational did
so by means of an ownership change, i.e. a takeover. This implies that the remaining 334
plants became part of a British MNE because the firm they belonged to started investing
abroad. This is the variation we use to identify βMNE. In total, the upper panel shows
that we have 1,118 changes between non MNE and MNE status.61 The lower panel shows
that 784 of these changes involved a change in ownership, i.e. a takeover. Overall panel 1
of table 6 shows that about 10 percent of all the transition events we can observe in the
data involve a change in multinational status.62 From panel 2 we can derive that about
40 percent of all ownership changes in our sample involve changes between multinational
status.63 Thus, while the majority of plants do not switch status, in the data there is still
some non negligible amount of status changes.
To summarize, our results suggest the following. First, in line with the predictions of
Dunning, we find evidence for an MNE firm effect. This evidence is stronger when we
consider plants which have been part of an MNE for a longer time period. This suggests
that MNE firm specific advantages require some time to materialise at the plant level.
Second, we find strong and robust evidence of plant picking by MNEs. Third, the US seems
to be the best at cherry picking the most productive plants in Great Britain, and indeed
this seems to be the source of the additional US advantage found in the OLS regressions.
Fourth, there seems to be a small advantage of foreign non US MNE firms in acquiring
better plants, although this is significantly smaller than for their US counterparts and
not robust across different specifications. Fifth, we do not find any evidence that FDI
of British firms has a direct short run beneficial effect on the productivity of plants they
own in Britain, but again this result might be driven by the rather small length of our
sample period.
61we obtain this figure by summing the off diagonal elements of row 1 and column 1 in the upper panel.
62That’s computed as the share of all off diagonal elements to the sum of all cells of table 6.
63Again computed as the share of all off diagonal elements this time of panel 2
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7 Conclusion
This is the first study which identifies domestic multinationals in the Annual Respondent
Database (ARD), the most comprehensive plant level dataset for Great Britain. We find
that plants owned by British multinationals in Britain are more productive than plants
with no international involvement. While British MNE plants have on average the same
productivity as foreign owned plants, we find a significant productivity advantage of US
owned plants. This evidence makes several contributions to the literature. Firstly it is
in line with theoretical models of MNEs which perceive MNEs as a self selected set of
the best firms in any country (?). Secondly it confirms and qualifies an earlier study by
Doms and Jensen (Doms and Jensen, 1998) for the US which shows a similar ranking for
MNEs from different countries. However, in their case it could not be ruled out that the
leadership of US multinationals was simply the consequence of a home advantage. Our
results also have implications for economic policy in the UK where according to a widely
held view incentives for foreign MNEs to locate in Britain are one potential instrument
to increase aggregate productivity performance.
In the second part of our paper we exploit the longitudinal dimension of our data to
look at three hypotheses regarding the nature of the MNE advantages. Firstly, is the su-
perior performance of MNE plants driven by specific firm level assets – such as managerial
skills, patents, branding and production processes – which MNEs can transfer to any of
their subsidiaries (Markusen 1995 and Dunning 1981)? Secondly, are MNEs simply better
at cherry-picking the best plants in the host country? Thirdly, do plants owned by British
firms that start investing abroad experience productivity improvements as a direct con-
sequence of FDI, because of, firm-level scale economies, technology sourcing from abroad
or other learning effects? We find evidence confirming that the MNE advantage can be
attributed to both MNEs having higher firm fixed effects and MNEs owning plants with
better plant fixed effects. Regarding superiority of US firms over all other MNEs our evi-
dence suggests that it is entirely driven by a particular ability of US firms to takeover the
best British plants rather than improving the productivity of acquired plants any more
than other MNEs do. Finally, our data does not find any robust evidence for an ex-post
productivity increase in domestic plants of British firms that start investing abroad. This
might be due to the short time series available to us.
An immediate question arising from our research, which might be the focus of future
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research, is as follows: why are US firms better than all other MNEs at obtaining the
best plants? There are several possible explanations. One hypothesis is that managers of
US MNEs pursue more aggressive takeover strategies and have specific skills that make
them more successful in this activity. A second explanation is related to the particular
time period considered. Indeed, in the second half of the 1990s, the US Stock market
experienced a boom with spectacular equity prices increases. During that period, the
S&P500, the Dow Jones Industrial and the Nasdaq Composite indexes more than doubled.
US MNEs, overvalued in the US stock market, and thus with access to low cost capital,
might have found it more profitable to use this capital to target firms abroad (e.g. in the
UK) not affected by the same stock market bubble, rather than in the home country64.
With the data at hand, we cannot thoroughly investigate these hypotheses, but this is an
area of research that deserves further exploration.
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A Variable Definitions
• Capital stock: capital stock was calculated using a perpetual inventory method
(PIM). For a more detailed description of the method adopted we refer to Martin
(2002)
• Deflators: to deflate output measures (gross output and value added) we use pro-
ducer price indices at the 4-digit SIC92 industry level. To deflate intermediates,
we use material price deflators at the 2-digit SIC92 industry level. The base year
is 1995. Capital stock is deflated using investment deflators with base year 1995;
for years pre-1995 these are implicitly derived from nominal and real sectoral ONS
historical investment series. From 1995 onwards I use the publicly available MM17
series.
• Foreign plants are plants owned by foreign owned enterprise groups.
• Country groups:
EUnorth includes plants owned by Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland , Luxem-
bourg, Sweden and Republic of Ireland.
EUsouth includes plants owned by Italy, Spain and Canary Islands, Portugal and
Greece.
Tax includes plants owned by British Virgin Islands, Channel Islands, Isle of Man,
Liechtenstein, Antigua and Barbuda, Cyprus and US Virgin Islands.
otherEurope includes plants owned by Norway and Switzerland.
otherOECD includes plants owned by Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Ice-
land, Mexico, Poland, South Korea and Turkey.
other is a residual category that includes plants owned by the rest of the world
and plants which are foreign owned but whose nationality is unknown.
• Weights are calculated using the register employment information on the basis of 4
digit sector, region and employment cells. For each cell i the weight is calculated as
Number of plants in register in cell i
Number of selected plants cell i
.
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B The monotone relationship between profits and
shocks
Start by noting that given our assumption of a homogenous production function (equation
7) we can write the cost minimization problem as:
C˘(K˘it,wV it) = min
X˘V it
∑
z 6=K
wzitX˘zit s.t. 1 = f
(
K˘it, X˘V it
)
(29)
where wzit represents the cost of factor z and K˘it =
Kit
Q˘it
with Q˘it =
(
Qit
Ait
) 1
γ
. X˘V it collects
the same transformation for all variable production factors in a vector. Total cost become
in terms of Equation 29
Cit = C˘itQ˘it (30)
Next consider the profit function.
Πit(Kit, λit, ait,wit) = Rit − Cit
Given the demand function 4 and the cost function 30 we can write it as
Πit(Kit, λit, ait,wit) =
(
ΛitRt
Pt
) 1
η
PtQ
1− 1
η − C˘itQ˘it (31)
Note that the firm’s profit maximization first order condition is
(
1− 1
η
)
Rit
Qit
=
1
γ
z(Q˘it, K˘it)
Q˘it
Qit
(32)
where
z(Q˘it, K˘it) =
∂C˘it
∂Q˘it
Q˘it + C˘it (33)
Finally, note that the derivatives of profit with respect to changes in λit and ait are
∂Πit
∂λit
= µ−1Rit
and
∂Πit
∂ait
= z(Q˘it, K˘it)
1
γ
(
Qit
Ait
) 1
γ
= µ−1Rit (34)
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where the last equality follows from the first order condition 3265 and
µ =
(
1− 1
η
)−1
As a consequence of all these results we get for the total differential of profits
dΠit = Rit
1
µ
(dλit + dait) = Ritdωit (35)
which establishes that there is a positive relationship between profits and composite shock
index ωit.
65This is an application of the envelope theorem
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C Testing if µ is constant
In this section, we describe a simple test of the hypothesis that µ is uniform within each
4 digit sector based on over-identifying restrictions. As expected, the null hypothesis is
rejected in the majority of sectors. Column 3 of table ?? shows estimates of equation 20
on a restricted sample of plants in sectors where the null hypothesis of uniform µ cannot
be rejected to check the robustness of our results. Our test works as follows: if we want
to allow for a more general market structure then the coefficient of capital in Equation
18 is not constant but depends on the quality parameter of the firm, λit.
66
rit − viit = βKit−1kit + g(kit−1,Πit−1) + νit (36)
where βKit−1 =
γ
µ
(λit−1). 67 If we nevertheless used a specification with constant βK we
are faced with the following situation:
rit − viit = βKkit + g(kit−1,Πit−1) + νit + (βKit − βK)kit (37)
where βK represents the constant capital coefficient we estimate. Equation 37 shows
that there is unaccounted for heterogeneity which is correlated with the explanatory
variables, thus an estimator based on zero correlation conditions between kit, Πit−1, etc.
and the error term breaks down. Equation 37 is the alternative specification to the null
hypothesisof a constant βK . Thus it can help us find restrictions which allow us to test
our hypothesis. We already mentioned the first set of these restrictions: zero correlation
between εˇit = rit − viit − βKkit − g(kit−1,Πit−1) and the explanatory variables in 37:
E{εˇitXit} = 0 (38)
whereXit ∈ {kit, kit−1,Πit−1}. An additional instrument would be the interaction between
current capital stocks and last periods demand shock, kit · λit−1. The problem with this
is of course that λit−1 is not observed. Note however that since λit is a component of ωit
and although ωit is not observed we have a way of controlling for it: we approximate it by
66For simplicity we make the formal argument in terms of log levels and not deviations from log values
of the median plant as in section 5.3. The argument can be made similarly in both cases.
67Note that in order to use our test we implicitly need to assume that there is a certain sluggishness
in price setting: markups depend on last period’s realization of the λ-shock, as we describe below.
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a polynomial in Πit and kit. This implies that we can derive additional zero correlation
conditions for the interaction of kit with all lagged polynomial terms, thus under the null
εˇit will not be correlated with terms such as kit · kit−1 · Πit−1, etc. Note here, that it is
crucial to make the assumption about sluggish prices. Because there would always be a
correlation between νit and ωit we could not make a similar argument starting from a zero
correlation condition between kit · λit and εˇit. Finally note that, because of the presence
of kit in εˇit, under the alternative hypothesis (37), all these zero correlation conditions
break down and they are thus indeed a means to test our hypothesis.
We implement the test as a Sargan-Test where we use the restrictions in 38 to exactly
identify all required parameters and then test the zero correlation of the restrictions from
the polynomial interactions as a χ2-distributed statistic.
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Table 7: Statistics on double fixed effects groups
(1) (2) (3)
obs plants firm
min 2 1 1
max 634 201 55
median 3 1 1
groups 6754
obs 28338
Notes: The first panel reports summary statistics for the double fixed effects groups (DFG) in our
sample. Column 1 row 1 shows that the smallest DFG consists of 2 observations, the largest of 634 and
the median group of 3 observations. Columns 3 and 4 report the same statistics for the numbers of
plants and firms.
D A double fixed effects approach
We suggested that Equation 22 could also be estimated using a double fixed effects
methodology. This section discusses how this could be done and the problems it raises.
Firm and plant effects can be identified separately to the extent that plants move
between firms. Abowd et al. (2002) have laid out in detail which firm and plant effects
we can hope to identify:68 They define sets of ‘double fixed effect groups’ (DFG). A DF
group DFGg is defined as the set of all firms and plants which interact over the sample
period. A firm and a plant interact simply if the plant is owned by the firm. Two plants
interact if they are both owned by the same firm at some but not necessarily the same
point in time. Two firms interact if they own the same plant at different points in time.
Abowd et al. show that for each plant and each firm in a DFG one can identify a fixed
effect which is informative about its productivity relative to the group average, where the
group average includes the fixed effect of an omitted reference firm, µR, and an omitted
reference plant αr. Thus, any estimated fixed effect has to be interpreted as relative to
the omitted plant and firm.
Table 7 reports some statistics on these groups. Consider first the second panel which
reports that there are in total 6754 such groups in our dataset. Also note that the number
of observations has now reduced because we can only use observations from plants we
observe at least twice. Panel 1 reports various statistics on these 6,754 groups. We see
that the majority of groups is rather small. Both the median number of plants and firms
68Abowd et al. work with matched employer-employee panels but their results apply to our problem
immediately once plants take on the role of employees and firms the role of employers.
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Table 8: Double fixed effects regression results
(1) (2)
US -0.031 0.039
(0.013)∗∗ (0.024)∗
MNE 0.002 0.020
(0.018) (0.018)
FOR 0.026 0.028
(0.018) (0.025)
green GB non MNE 0.000
(0.021)
green US 0.030
(0.054)
green FOR 0.037
(0.063)
green MNE -0.001
(0.037)
obs 2842 2865
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients and standard errors are from the third-stage of the
double-fixed effects model. In column 1 the dependent variable is firm fixed effects estimated in the second-stage. ever
US firm is 1 for all US firms. ever MNE firm is 1 for all MNE firms. ever FOR firm is 1 for non US foreign firms. In
Column 2 the dependent variable is the plant fixed effects estimated in the second-stage ever MNE plant is 1 for all
plants that have ever been owned by a MNE over the course of the sample period. Similarly for the ever US and ever
other foreign dummies. The green dummies take value one for all plants that are established during the course of the
sample period (1996-2000), green GB non MNE is one for plants owned by domestic firms when established. green
MNE is one for plants owned by MNE firms when established. green US (green FOR) is one for plants owned by US
(other foreign) firms when established.
∗ significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level. ∗∗ significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. ∗∗∗
significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level.
(row 3 in columns 2 and 3) is 1 one which means that our dataset consists mainly of firms
that own one plant which is never sold. For these there is no chance of separating firm
and plant effects. Our sample thus reduces to those groups which consist of at least 2
plants or firms. This corresponds to about one third of our original sample.
After establishing how many fixed effects can effectively be identified the double fixed
effects problem is in principle nothing else but a regression on dummies for each plant and
firm whose fixed effect can be identified. However, this runs into computational problems
because of the sheer size of the matrices that are to be inverted. Abowd et al. apply
some advanced linear algebra techniques to get round this problem. However, since all
coefficients’ estimates are relative to a group, neither efficiency of consistency is lost if
estimates are obtained separately for each group. In our case the largest group consists
of 55 firms and 201 plants. This is still in the range feasible for a normal dummy variable
regression, which is our strategy. In each group we can then estimate the fixed effects of
each plant and firm except for one reference plant and firm:
̂αi − αr − µR and ̂µJ − αr − µR
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where αr is the reference plant and µR the reference firm.
To examine the existence of MNE firm and plant effects as discussed in Section 6 we
regress these estimated fixed effects on MNE plant and firm dummies; i.e. for the firm
effect:
̂µJ − αr − µR = βMNEeverFirmMNEeverJ(i,t) + εit (39)
Can we hope that βMNEeverFirm provides a consistent estimator of
E{µJ |MNEeverJ(i,t) = 1} (40)
Only if we can assume that there is no systematic correlation between µJ + αi and
MNEeverJ(i,t). However, this is unlikely because multinational firms are more likely to inter-
act with other multinational firms or with domestic firms which have higher productivity
so that E{µJ |1} > E{µJ |0}. This would introduce a downward bias in our estimate of
βMNEeverFirm . A similar argument applies to our estimate of the MNE plant effect. Given the
downward bias we expect that regressions of 39 and the equivalent plant equation lead to
lower MNE firm and MNE plant estimates than the results found in Section 6.
Table 8 shows estimates of equation 39 in column 1 and the equivalent plant level
equation in Column 2. All point estimates are lower than the comparable estimates in
Section 6 and most effects are found to be non significant. Only the US plant effect is still
significant at the 10 percent level (column 2, row 1), whereas The US firm effect estimate
is now negative and significant at the 5 percent level.
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